



SECURITY ASSESSMENT

100 BLACKS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WHO CARE - ESB Security Assessment

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Executive Summary

An on-site security assessment of the Empire State Building (ESB), including confidential interviews with on-duty security officers, revealed an alarming number of shortcomings in the building access control, security staff structure and safety procedures, basic security equipment and training. Below is a summary of the ESB's most glaring security shortcomings:

Uninhibited Building Access

- Survey staff member was able to enter the building and pass through security with a fully loaded 15 round weapon magazine in their briefcase
- No physical barriers are in place to prevent a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) from entering the loading dock. A VBIED detonation in the loading dock would cause substantially more damage than a curbside.
- Visitors have unrestricted access throughout the building. Without challenge or interruption, survey staff were able to access any floor of their choosing – including stairways and unrestricted floors

Insufficient Training

- Security officers have been provided with only basic, if not limited description of the building and their responsibilities and duties. Officers had not been provided a complete tour of the building; had not been briefed on site-specific security details; and had not been trained in the latest post-9/11 security skills, including anti-terrorism awareness, fire safety and weapons of mass destruction emergency service.

Inadequate Security and Safety Procedures

- No safety measures are in place to check packages brought in by tenants of the building
- Tourists with bags and packages are not inspected until they are already inside the building
- Security bulletins and photographs are rarely given to security officers

Incomplete Equipment

- Security officers are not provided with basic communications and emergency equipment, including portable radios and flashlights, which are essential for managing emergencies.

Poorly Defined Chain of Command

- Failure to establish a clearly understood chain of command leaves officers uncertain about potentially life-saving operating procedures in an emergency.

INTRODUCTION

After the destruction of the World Trade Center during the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Empire State Building (ESB) has once again become the most recognizable building in New York. It is appealing for a potential terrorist attack for the following reasons:

- 1 ESB is a symbol and an icon of New York City's skyline
- 2 Thousands of tourists and visitors enter the building everyday
- 3 After 9/11 television and radio stations rely on the building for their transmissions.
- 4 There is unrestricted access throughout the ESB

These concerns prompted an increase of random bomb detection searches, targeted patrols and visits to the building by members of the New York City Police Department's elite anti-terrorism units. Given the past history of serious events and the sensitive status of the ESB, security should be enhanced to match the current level of threat.

100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care is a civil rights organization that was founded by a core group of concerned African Americans representing a variety of professions within the field of Law Enforcement. These individuals share a sense of community, cultural and professional pride.

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100 Blacks in Law Enforcement Who Care was contracted by SEIU local 32BJ to conduct a security assessment of the Empire State Building. The assessment was deemed necessary given the heightened state of terror alert post September 11, 2001. The consultants used for the on-site assessment have a combined 180 years of varied law enforcement experience in management, investigations and supervision.

BUILDING BACKGROUND

As a world known landmark and a major tourist attraction, the ESB is one of the most populated buildings in New York City. Approximately 5,000 to 10,000 people visit per day and an estimated 4 million enter the building each year. The observation deck, which is located on the 86th floor, is opened from 8 am to 12 midnight everyday and later on weekends.

The building is centrally located in the heart of Mid-town Manhattan, on fashionable 5th Avenue and 34th Street. Both streets are wide enough to provide for emergency response vehicles as needed. Shops and buildings surrounded the ESB in both directions.

The cross-town bus passes on the north side of the building while the southbound bus passes on the east main entrance. Bellevue Medical Center is due east at 1st Ave, and the Midtown South precinct is four blocks west on 35th Street

Commercial Use:

The ESB is host to hundreds of businesses doing commerce on local, national, and international levels. Commercial rental space in the building can range from 1,500 square feet to 103,000 square feet per floor.

There are 3 eateries in the building, 7 retail stores (including a 24 hour Walgreen's Pharmacy), and 6 service establishments including a post office. Most of these businesses are accessible from the street and lobby.

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There are three banks located in the building:

- 1 Bank of America
- 2 HSBC
- 3 Bank of New York

The communication antenna atop of the building was the only means of communication in New York City during the September 11th 2001 terrorist attack. It presently transmits cellular phone and cable television communication.

External Perimeter Site Survey Analysis:

Upon conducting a security survey of all public access areas of the ESB, the following are observations and recommendations based on a visual site survey:

Observation: The loading dock is located on 33rd Street west of 5th Avenue, at the end of the building line. There are no physical barriers to stop a Vehicle Bourne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) from backing into the loading dock. If a VBIED detonates in the loading dock much more damage will be done to the building than if detonated by the curbside.

Recommendation: A crash rated cable arm, hydraulic bollards or surface mounted barriers should be installed to physically stop trucks from entering the loading dock until it is cleared with security.



Surface Mounted Barrier

Observation: Air intakes are located on 33rd Street by the loading dock. They are approximately fifty feet from the street level. Air intakes bring air into the building from the outside.

Recommendation: Lighting should be increased in these areas and CCTV cameras should be installed to view the air intakes in order to decrease the possibility of a person introducing a chemical, biological or radiological agent to these air intakes.

Observation: The building façade at the ground level around the perimeter is mostly glass. This makes it easy for a VBIED to crash through the building, detonating its explosives. Damage to the building is considerably greater if a VBIED detonates in the building as opposed to near the building line. Visual examination reveals that the glazing does not appear to be explosive resistant. When an explosion detonates near a building line, injury and death occurs due to glass fragmentation. Planters appear to

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be placed along the perimeter of the building to prevent a VBIED from entering the building.

Recommendation 1: Security should be diligent and make sure vehicles are not parked along the building side of the street around the perimeter and report immediately any suspicious vehicles in the area.

Recommendation 2: To prevent glass from breaking apart and flying like missiles in the air, bomb resistant glazing should be installed and anchored to the frame around the perimeter of the building, from at least floors one through five. During an explosion the blast resistant film will prevent the glass from breaking into pieces and flying through the air. Anchoring the blast resistant film to the frame will keep the glass in, preventing the glass from flying out as one big piece.

Also, there are wide gaps around the perimeter where planters are not placed, especially on the northwest corner of 33rd Street and 5th Avenue and the Southwest corner of 34th Street and 5th Avenue. When installing the bollards there should be no gaps that can allow a vehicle to pass through the secured area and detonate within the building. Existing planters are small and do not appear to be crash rated. To receive a crash rating, a test is conducted to see how much force barrier can stop. A VBIED can probably defeat the planter's purpose. Crash rated bollards should be installed replacing the planters. VBIED's exploding along the building line would create significant damage to the buildings façade and injure or



Bollard

kill many people inside.

Observation: Trucks that are waiting to enter the loading dock stage at the curbside. This gives VBIED's legitimacy to stage at curbside without being challenged.

Recommendation: The trucks need to be checked immediately to see if they are authorized to be at the loading dock.

Internal Site Survey Security Analysis

LOBBY

Observation: There are five entrances that lead directly into the building, with the main entrance located on Fifth Avenue between 33rd & 34th Streets. The other four entrances are located on 33rd Street (two entrances) and 34th Street (two entrances). You can also enter through some store entrances located on the ground floor. The building's official website states all visitors must use the main entrance but observations indicate visitors can enter through any of these entrances without being challenged.

Recommendation: All visitors should be required to use the main entrance.

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Observation: Visitors to ESB have unrestricted access to all floors. On 2 separate occasions, survey staff was able to access several floors containing commercial establishments without challenge or interruption. On both occasions the survey staff entered, remained and utilized the non-secure stairways to access floors that should be restricted for tenants, employees and their registered guests.

Recommendation: All visitors should be issued color-coded identification badges with the name and floor to be visited.

Observation: When entering any of these entrances, there are no security checkpoints until you reach the elevators. The elevator security checkpoints are on the 33rd and 34th Street sides of the lobby. Each side has three checkpoints for employees and one checkpoint for visitors. The employee checkpoints are equipped with turnstiles with card reader access.

There is one security guard stationed at each employee checkpoint. The visitor's checkpoints are equipped with magnetometers and bag x-ray machines to detect any weapons or suspicious materials being brought into the secured area. There are two security guards stationed at each visitor's checkpoint.

During surveillance, terrorists will take advantage of weaknesses they see in the security. A terrorist can become an employee of a company that is located in the ESB and would be able to bring weapons and materials into the secured areas unchallenged.

Recommendation: To correct this problem magnetometers and bag x-ray machines should also be placed at the employee checkpoints.

Observation: Armed plainclothes guards are normally placed at the magnetometers located on the north and south sides of the lobby. Based on an interview with on duty security personnel, there have been occasions where there was a shortage of security officers. This resulted in one officer being assigned to cover both magnetometers. This was confirmed during our site survey.

Recommendation: An adequate number of personnel should be assigned to each magnetometer at all times. A diversion can lure the armed guard to a position leaving the other vulnerable, and allowing a breach. An armed guard must always have a back up who is also armed when dealing with large crowds of people.

Observation: Unarmed guards are located at the four entry points to the elevator banks. Those entry points are for employees with electronic access cards. The guard cannot verify the identity of the person entering.

Recommendation: A recently lost or stolen card may be utilized and the building breached by someone who wants to do harm. A photo imagery monitor should be at each turnstile. It would enable the guard to compare the face of the person entering to that of the one on file and registered to the card. The monitor can also

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provide vital information relative to the person's employer, job status, work location and telephone number.

Individuals who have been terminated would be flagged in the system and denied entry. If they are a danger to others it can be noted to call the police. Such a system also prevents violence in the work place by disgruntled employees.

Observation: In this screening area it was observed that the security staff allowed visitors to "bunch" around the walk-through portal area. Bunching is defined as the crowding that often occurs near walk-through portals as visitors gather their personal belongings or wait for friends or family members. This practice seriously hinders the ability of the screener who is assigned to "read the lights" that appear on the top of the walkthrough portal. These lights provide an alert to the possibility that the person who just entered the area, is in possession of an item that is of heavy metal density, which may or may not be a weapon. It can cause the magnetometer to give a false reading. When more than one person is in close proximity to the machine, its calibration setting may cause it to detect (or in some cases, not detect) the presence of metal on other persons who are standing close by the machine's sensors.

Large numbers of people who are waiting to be screened and are standing too close to the portals can cause unnecessary confusion and distractions to the security screeners. This was true on one of our staff's visit to the building on a day which had a relatively low number of visitors. On a day where there were three times as many visitors, the distractions would be multiplied.

Recommendation: It is strongly recommended that security personnel better coordinate the flow of traffic entering the magnetometer. (single entry only)

2nd FLOOR VISTOR AREA

Observation: There is an escalator and elevator by the main entrance that leads to the second floor visitor's area. This area is manned with a uniformed security officer. This is the area where visitors go to take the elevator to the observatory deck. The elevator leading to the 2nd floor is only used for the handicapped and individuals with baby strollers. There is a fixed CCTV camera above the escalator, viewing people proceeding up the escalator. At this level visitors are required to go through a rope line that leads to three security checkpoint stations, equipped with magnetometers and bag x-ray machines. After going through the checkpoint you proceed to a line to purchase tickets then wait on a line to enter the elevators that will go to the observation deck. The elevators go to the 80th floor where you change to another elevator.

Recommendation: The checkpoints on the 2nd floor should be placed closer to the street entrances. The further a person gets into the building without being checked the more opportunity they have to choose where they can do damage.

80th FLOOR VISTOR AREA

Observation: An elevator takes you from the 2nd floor to the 80th floor. When exiting the elevator you are immediately escorted to another elevator that will take you to the observation deck. There are no physical security barriers, except for security guards, to make sure a person does not intentionally wander away from the public area.

Recommendation: With the element of human error there is always a chance a person can elude security when there is enough confusion. Physical barriers, like walls, should be placed at the elevator area.

86th FLOOR OBSERVATORY DECK:

Observation: When exiting the elevator you are directed away from the elevator area and onto the observatory deck. This area has an inside and an outside area. In the inside area there are souvenir shops and bathrooms. In the outside area there are tourist binoculars to view the city. There are numerous security personnel stationed throughout the observatory deck. Security should be kept in these areas to check for any suspicious people or activity especially anyone performing surveillance of the area.

During the observation it was noted that there were CCTV cameras on the observation deck. The following is a list of CCTV cameras that were observed at

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the observatory deck:

-Inside Cameras:

1. Dome camera placed by the elevator bank area.
2. Dome camera placed by the east side of the building.
3. Dome camera placed by the west side of the building.

-Outside Cameras:

1. (2) Fixed cameras placed by the northeast corner of the building.
2. Fixed camera placed by the southwest corner of the building.
3. Fixed camera placed by the southeast corner of the building.

All the inside cameras are dome cameras that appear to be PTZ and all the outside cameras are fixed cameras that cover the whole outside perimeter of the building.

Recommendation: All CCTV cameras on the observatory deck should be in color for better identification of suspicious people. CCTV cameras placed on the outside of the observatory deck should also be low lux giving a clearer and brighter picture at night.

Observation: The lighting on the observation deck is not sufficient at night.

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Suspicious people can conduct surveillance as well as plant explosives without being detected because of darkness.

Recommendation: Upgrade the lighting to at least three-foot candles.

Observation: There is no documentation stating the identity and intended destination of visitors.

Recommendation: Visitors should be entered into a sign in log indicating identity and intended destination.

**The following is based on interviews of a sample of currently employed ESB security guards*

TRAINING

Overview:

All of the interviewed security officers possessed the required New York State mandated 8 and 16 hour certification and security license. However, these mandated requirements only represent the minimal level of training each licensed security officer is required to have at the point of certification. Interviewed security officers unanimously indicated that the available training is wholly inadequate.

Interviews:

Worker - Training consisted mostly of “learning as it occurs”. The one-hour training session he received regarding utilization of the scanner was in his judgment “rushed and unprofessional”. The individuals who demonstrated the scanner operation didn’t identify themselves nor did they entertain any questions.

He further indicated that most of his colleagues were not present during the one-hour crash course and had to rely on the few security officers who were given the cursory training to instruct them on how to use the machine. He has never had the opportunity to receive any additional training nor is he informed of the procedure to request such training.

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Worker - Had received additional training prior to being assigned to the ESB. He has not been compensated for the expense he incurred in order to receive this additional training, which he believes better prepared him for emergency situations. He also stated that security officers assigned to the ESB are not motivated to receive this costly training because trained and untrained officers receive the identical pay.

Worker – “Management doesn’t care if you have specialized training. They just want you on post acting like you know everything about security.” He further indicated that security officers are never briefed on current issues or concerns. Security handouts, bulletins and photographs are rarely given to security officers.

He recalled one occasion when he was shown photographs of individuals prohibited by management from entering the ESB, but he was prohibited from possessing the photographs for visual reference. “They showed us a picture really quick and wouldn’t give us a copy. How are we supposed to remember a face that we saw for 3 seconds when we come into contact with thousands of people each day?”

Recommendations: It is mandatory for security companies to develop in-house training sessions and instructive manuals for their entire security staff. All of the interviewed security officers articulated a desire to receive additional training but do not believe training is a priority to management.

Training is perhaps the most deficient component of security operations at the ESB. The development of a functional training program would give security officers the information that would enable them to be proficient in their responsibilities of securing

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persons and property. In order to guarantee that all security officers receive periodic in-house training, we recommend that they be assigned to these training sessions while they are working.

Building management should incorporate current intelligence information from the NYPD into the site's safety plan. **All** individual businesses inside the ESB should become part of the NYPD's 'Operation Nexus Network'. Membership allows businesses to obtain current counter-terrorism information and strategies delivered by trained Law Enforcement professionals. Incorporating ESB businesses in crime prevention in essence multiplies the site's security force and provides additional eyes, ears and intelligence information.

Security management should utilize the 'NYPD Shield' program to access declassified international security bulletins and information. The security training program should include the documents and information that is regularly released by the NYPD via federal authorities to fully educate the security officers. This invaluable resource requires simple registration through the NYPD. The declassified documents are released to qualified security companies. Other resources include the weekly NYPD produced news briefs, 'Terrorism Weekly' and 'CBRN Weekly' as well as the 'Intelligence and Analysis Briefs'. These periodic security bulletins and documents should be regularly distributed to the security staff. The only cost incurred would be the cost to reproduce the documents for distribution. Clearly there is vital real-time information available that must be incorporated into an effective 21st century security plan.

Due to the high volume of items delivered to the many commercial establishments

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in the ESB, security personnel should be trained on the handling of suspicious packages and items with the emphasis on bio-hazardous materials. There should be an on-site hazardous materials response team comprised of a select number of ESB security guards.

CERTIFICATION:

Overview:

Employee interviews revealed a lack of additional security certification opportunities offered by Copstat. All interviewed security guards indicated that they are in full compliance with the basic New York State mandated licensing requirements (8 hour and 16 hour certification courses/training prior to State approved license application) Employees indicated that there is no additional certification request form or regularly scheduled certification or specialty course opportunity announcements. New York State requires bi-annual renewal of Security Guard registration card (license).

Additional certification opportunities are available through the United States Department of Homeland Security, authorized private training schools, as well as traditional educational institutions. In New York City, the Thomas Shortman Fund a joint labor-management program sponsored by SEIU Local 32BJ and various employers in the Real Estate Industry, offers a comprehensive 40-hour anti-terrorism training for security officers. Other *advanced* training and certification courses in the following subjects include but are not limited to:

- Fire Safety
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Responder Fundamentals
- Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Awareness Training Program
- Emergency Response to Domestic Biological Incidents
- WMD Emergency Medical Services Training Program
- Critical Infrastructure Protection Training Program
- Criminal Investigation Training Program

In addition to the available off site training/certification opportunities, Security Management has the option to implement internal training mechanisms that would enhance the readiness/preparedness level of the security staff. The site itself is a training

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ground that apparently is not being used. Suggested training should include basic evacuation and fire safety and well as incident response. Internal, on site training is a cost effective, on the job training that allows flexible scheduling.

Interviews:

Worker- Has heard of certification opportunities but has never seen any listing or posting and has never been offered any specialized courses.

Worker - Only a select few employees are arbitrarily chosen for management initiated/sponsored certification/training but the selection process is unknown to him.

Worker - There is no posting or listing for additional certification and he has never been approached in regards to receiving additional certification.

All of the interviewed security officers stated that there is a definite need for certification opportunities and were unanimously in support of increased opportunity to receive the valuable certification courses. The security officers further indicated that they were receptive to schedule and tour changes if the certification opportunities conflicted with their current work schedule.

Recommendations: Certification courses are skill enhancement opportunities that provide the security with relevant knowledge and the confidence to provide exceptional service. Certification courses also enhance the professional image and capabilities of security officers. This additional specialty knowledge not only benefits management by

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developing a better skilled security officer, but it will also assist them with their recruitment and retention efforts.

These educational enhancement opportunities also augment the earning ability of the security officer. Therefore we strongly recommended that increased opportunities for additional security certification become a management funded voluntary cooperative program. Additionally, management should fund off site certification and the human resources department should post certification course opportunities, while establishing an employee eligibility list.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Overview:

Aside from being a prime target of terrorist, the ESB is also a complex multi-use commercial building. Interviews revealed that security officers only possess a basic knowledge of their general duties and responsibilities. They were never given a tactical tour of the ESB and have never received any specific detailed information regarding securing the ESB.

Interviews:

Worker - The instructions given regarding his duties and responsibilities were not specific to the ESB.

Worker - Working at the ESB is strictly "on the job training" and new employees "wing it" until they figure out their specific duties. This is accomplished by observing and interacting with other like-assigned employees.

Worker - There is no site-specific tactical information given to new hires or veteran employees.

None of the employees interviewed had received any written materials regarding their specific security responsibilities. None of the employees interviewed were supplied with even a generic job description

Recommendations: While being charged with the responsibility of securing a complex site such as the ESB, it is essential that every security officer be provided with a written copy of site specific guidelines. This would enable the security officers to frequently refer to these guidelines in order to refresh their knowledge of security duties and responsibilities.

Security guards must be given a complete tactical tour of the Empire State Building. The security force must be knowledgeable of all areas in the building. Their limited assignments should not preclude them from a working knowledge of the rest of the complex.

During an emergency, it is expected that there will be panic and disorder. Emergency responders are at a disadvantage if there is no practical understanding of the layout of the entire building. Security officers should also have immediate access to the building's architectural map, in case an unexpected tactical response is required.

When additional information arises regarding securing the ESB or when management creates a policy change, all security personnel should receive daily written updates. The failure to supply security officers with written materials outlining their specific duties and responsibilities, sensitive ESB locations, security updates, etc. encourage officers to adopt what one officer described as a "figure it out mentality". This creates an environment that is primed for ineffective response to emergency situations.

EQUIPMENT / UNIFORM

Overview:

Interviewed security officers received no special equipment such as portable radios, flashlights, whistles, reflective belts, non-lethal weapons, etc. The officers interviewed are also not assigned memo books to document incidents, indicate post changes, meal times or supervision visits.

Interviews:

Worker - Purchased his uniform and expects no refund if or when he is no longer employed by Copstat. Portable radios were assigned only to armed plainclothes security guards, which in the past has obstructed his ability to communicate with others during emergency situations. When assigned to the observation deck during peak hours, because of the high volume of visitors, he is not able to make visual contact with other security officer which amplifies his inability to summons assistance during emergency situations.

Worker – It is unclear whether or not a return of his uniform to the company will result in a full refund. Additionally, “they don’t want us to take notes, they only want us to be in uniform wherever they say.”

Worker -The only item he received was a uniform that he paid for. He further “believes” upon his leaving COPSTAT, he will return the uniform items for a refund of the money he spent on them. He also stated that the armed plainclothes security who are

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the only ones equipped with portable radios are assigned to various posts throughout the ESB. This prevents him from being able to communicate an emergency message to the security operations base or other security personnel.

While assigned to the ESB, there have been potentially violent disturbances on site when armed security guards were not present. He was forced to “hope” that the security cameras captured the event, which would cause the base to dispatch additional personnel for assistance. “They never gave us any notepads or books to write anything in. We have to hope our memory is good enough to remember dates and times.”

Recommendations: Failure to supply the security force with adequate equipment places the site and all its employees at a severe disadvantage in dealing with emergency response and service. A vital part of effective security requires that all security officers have access to the necessary tools and equipment, which can assist them in performing their duties. Supplying the security officers with the most fundamental equipment enables them to provide a satisfactory level of protection and service to the public

The most glaring failure is the manner in which portable radios are distributed. All security officers should be equipped with a portable radio in order to communicate with other officers and/or the security base. Other basic items which should be provided to security officers are flashlights, high visibility reflective belts / vests and whistles. These very basic items are the tools necessary to provide a sufficient level of security during an emergency situation.

Security officers should be provided with memo books because it is vital to document important information, such as the time they arrived or left their post, the

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condition of their post, significant incidents / information etc.

SUPERVISION

Overview:

The on site security supervisory structure is not clearly defined and many of the security officers are confused by it. Security supervisors are not distinguished by military rank and wear no distinguishing insignias. Instructions as to whom they are accountable is vague and unclear. This raises serious questions over accountability and the chain of command.

Interviews:

Worker- “Our supervisors dress exactly like we do and sometimes the armed guards act like supervisors. Because the armed guys are law enforcement guys, we just assume they are supervisors. No one has told me directly that they are but they sometimes play that roll. It’s confusing.”

Worker- “If you look at our supervisors you can’t tell the difference between them and the regular guards. I was told that we have to also take instructions from the armed guys. A lot of days you never get to see a supervisor one on one.”

Worker- “We mostly look at the armed guards as supervisors until the base sees something on camera and then the supervisors show up.”

Recommendations: Site security supervisors should identify themselves as supervisors to all of their subordinates. This introduction should also include supervisors verifying that subordinate security officers understand their assignments. Supervisors should also

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make periodic visits to each post in order to verify that officers are performing their duties.

Supervision is a critical component in maintaining efficiency in the work place. The enforcement of rules and regulations, being available for consultation or referrals, and the need to take control in emergency situations all require supervisors to be on site. They should also have distinguishing uniforms or insignia which would allow the security officers and the public to readily identify them as supervisors.

SITE ACCESS

Overview:

The most strategic point of the ESB is the point of entry. The complexities of securing a multi-use commercial building require both standardization and accommodation. Because the Empire State Building is both a major tourist attraction and a commercial location, there exists a dual strategy for screening and access. Careful attention has to be given to the identity of those visiting and working inside of the ESB. On 2 separate occasions, survey staff was able to access several floors containing commercial establishments without challenge or interruption. On both occasions the survey staff entered, remained and utilized the non-secure stairways to access floors that should be restricted for tenants, employees and their registered guests. On a separate visit, a survey staff member was able to secrete a loaded 15 round capacity magazine in a briefcase that subsequently passed through magnetometer scanning undetected.

The current security practice makes it impossible to enforce restricted access, thereby leaving large portions of the ESB clearly vulnerable. Security breaches cannot be prevented given the current strategy of security guard restricted access and the inability to effectively monitor tenant/tenant guest/visitor movements.

Tenant entry procedure consists of identification card access. Tenants display their issued identification cards are given largely unrestricted access to the site. There is no procedure in place for verification of the current status of the tenant nor is there a monitor for visual verification by security staff. Tenants are allowed uncontrolled access to multiple floors throughout the ESB. There is no destination verification for persons

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who display the identification card thereby granting unmonitored access to multiple floors. There is no verification of tenant exit thereby making it impossible to provide an accurate, real time site population total.

Security management of a multi-use commercial building is difficult and challenging to coordinate. Management must establish a consistent scanning and entry process, otherwise there is a high risk of a security breaches. Of course there should be special accommodations made to tenants and merchants. However, if the ultimate goal is optimum security, the current practice is self defeating. The electronic I.D. passes that are issued to tenants must be strictly regulated. Given that employee status in the building is constantly changing, the verification of full access tenants must be strictly regulated. A security audit of tenant/employee identification and access should be reviewed monthly and any changes should be documented and available for the security guards review. Mere possession of a pass without scrutiny creates a potentially dangerous environment.

The security officer's responsibilities should include an expedited screening process for tenants and visual scrutiny of all I.D. passes. Management should, on random days, conduct integrity tests of tenant I.D. passes by verifying their status based on a master access list, available to the security officers. This additional security measure adds to the overall safety of the entire building, realizing that the commercial tenant areas are connected to the other areas and therefore have direct impact on the security integrity of the building. Security guards must be given increased access and responsibility throughout the ESB. The security threat is a mobile one and proactive steps must be taken to insure that the entire site utilizes omnipresence as a way to discourage unlawful

activity. Security posts should be expanded to include all access areas.

Guest entry procedure consists of standard scanning process. The failure to monitor guests of tenants while on site, precludes the ability to safely and orderly evacuate the ESB in case of emergency. The current system of ‘beyond the scanner trust’ is an emergency coordination nightmare and presents significant safety challenges to the security personnel and building occupants.

Visitor/Tourist entry procedure consists of a magnetometer scanning. Once the initial scanning is completed, visitors are directed to a bank of elevators that give access not only to the popular observation deck, but other non-tourist commercial establishments in the building. Visitor/Tourists have unmonitored access to several floors as well as the stairways throughout the ESB. The restrictive assignment of security personnel to only intended tourist locations leaves the rest of the site vulnerable to a host of criminal activities. Scanning and omnipresence alone does not provide adequate protection to the ESB.

Interviews:

Worker -“The tenants don’t go through a screening process. They get special treatment.”

Worker- “It doesn’t make sense that tenants can go straight through with packages because they have I.D. passes. Who can say that a terrorist can’t make a copy of the I.D. pass.” “We don’t have complete access to the entire building. We have our posts and positions and that’s it.”

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Worker- “Sometimes employees of the businesses get fired and the still have their passes. There are a lot of passes out there that haven’t been accounted for. How easy would it be for a terrorist to get a job inside, get fired and hold on to their pass? I’m pretty sure that management doesn’t do security screening of all the people who work in the building and that’s scary.” “Our I.D. passes are restricted and limited. I am not allowed on certain floors and areas for security reasons. I thought we were the security. It doesn’t make sense. If anything goes wrong, I know they’ll say we’re responsible but we can’t go everywhere in the building. Our access is limited to tourist areas.” Security guards do not have full access to the entire site.

Recommendations: Screening and magnetometer use must be standardized at all entry points. Tenant access must include modified screening procedures to ensure that prohibited items are prevented from entering the ESB. All packages from all entrants should be thoroughly screened and scrutinized in order to establish a more secure environment. An expedited, modified screening process and area for identification card tenants without carried items would prevent entry congestion.

Standard guest-entry procedure should include color-coded, floor specific passes, clearly visible on the outermost garment. Additional security personnel should be deployed to ensure directed movement in the ESB. Valid identification for registration should be mandatory for all guests. Upon entry guests should be registered by security staff and issued the color-coded pass, which would be returned to security staff upon exit. After verified exit, security staff should note the final exit in the registration log.

Visitor/Tourist entry should also include the use of color-coded, floor specific

passes. Due to the number of potential visitor/tourist entries, this entry point is perhaps the most vulnerable to security breach. The unrestricted movement of visitor/tourists at this historic icon has created a pseudo-safe environment. Failure to better restrict and guide large numbers visitor/tourists to the specific locations has created the very real threat of large-scale security breach. Multiple operatives could very easily secrete themselves in strategically sensitive locations and cause large-scale devastation without detection because entry procedures and on-site monitoring is overly reliant on video surveillance and poor deployment of security personnel.

Security personnel should be regularly deployed to the stairways. There should be actual stairway security posts that conduct multi-floor verticals to prevent trespass and unauthorized access. Additional roving posts should be deployed to various floors to enforce the color-coded pass restrictions.

Messenger and delivery items should be delivered to a separate screening location where the items can be telephone or in person verified, scanned and logged in. Tenants should be vigilant about notifying security personnel about anticipated items prior to their delivery. Unanticipated items should be handled and delivered with extreme care and precaution.

METHODOLOGY

The on-site assessment consisted of observations, formal and informal employee interviews conducted over the course of 11 days as well as a 5 day review of available documents and resource materials.

The consultants used for the on-site assessment have a combined 180 years of varied law enforcement experience in management, investigations and supervision.